Abstract: This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original dataset on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying.
punishments for noncompliance with IMF conditionality. He concludes, "Although the United
States holds a minority of votes, it does indeed call the shots at the IMF, as critics allege " (2002: 62) . Woods (2003) documents that the United States virtually controls major decisions at the IMF; Fratianni and Pattison (2003) summarize evidence showing that the G7 are in control of the IMF on the most important issues and that staff autonomy is restricted to areas that are of marginal interest to its shareholders. Copelovitch (2010) shows that political influence is strongest when the major shareholders agree on the importance of a country. Faini and Grilli (2004) report that IMF lending is influenced by the United States and the European Union. In the words of Rieffel (2003: 28-29) , "The IMF is an instrument of the G-7 countries. There is no example that comes easily to mind of a position taken by the IMF on any systematic issue without the tacit, if not explicit, support of the United States and the other G-7 countries."
Of central importance to this study, Dreher et al. (2009a show that elected members of the UNSC are more likely to participate in IMF programs and the conditions attached are fewer in number and narrower in scope than for other countries. They do not find any effect on loan size -a matter to which we return below. Still, we take the other findings as evidence of IMF favoritism for UNSC members. As the argument goes, the major shareholders of the IMF -the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom -desire influence on the UNSC. The governments of some developing countries may care more about the foreign exchange that the IMF can provide than they care about the global security issues considered important by the IMF's major shareholders. Trades of UNSC votes for IMF loans are thus possible.
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This raises some questions: why do the major shareholders care about UNSC votes? Why should they use the IMF to obtain leverage over UNSC members? And are the IMF loans in fact correlated with voting behavior at the UNSC?
With respect to the first question, the UNSC is the primary organ of the United Nations with responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council has the power to make binding resolutions and may adopt legally binding measures in order to maintain or restore international peace -including the investigation of international disputes, the imposition of economic sanctions, and the use of armed forces in military actions.
Historically, when the United States acts in concert with the UNSC, it bears a smaller share of the burden of international campaigns (Sandler and Hartley 1999) . So, it stands to reason that the United States should care about UNSC resolutions. Yet, the elected members of the UNSC have a limited impact on passing them. Veto power on the Security Council belongs to each of the five permanent members (the victors of World War II: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The ten elected members, which represent various regions of the world, are rarely pivotal (O'Neill 1996) . Still, nine total votes are required for a resolution to pass, and since permanent members frequently abstain, upwards of four out of the ten elected members must vote in favor.
A more likely reason to care about the votes of elected UNSC members, beyond their formal voting power, is legitimacy (Voeten 2005; Hurd 2007; Caron 1993; Claude 1966) . As Hurd (2007) explains, the elected members serve the purpose of giving voice to the "rest of the world" on the Security Council. And the legitimizing effect of the Security Council may extend beyond the international level and into domestic politics. For example, Chapman and Reiter (2004) find that US Presidents enjoy higher levels of public support for actions endorsed by the 7 UNSC, an effect not found for any other international organization they test.
1 In the absence of UNSC legitimacy, domestic public support might be more difficult to achieve and the US Congress might be recalcitrant (Voeten 2001; Hurd 2007; Hurd and Cronin 2008) . Voeten (2001) provides examples. He cites the memoirs of James Baker (1995: 278) 1986 , 1996 Abbott and Snidal 1998) . In terms of leverage, recall that the IMF does not 9 provide the entire loan upfront, and continued disbursements are conditioned -in principle -on economic policy changes. The IMF Executive Board, however, has the final word on all disbursements and has discretion in deeming countries compliant (Stone 2002 (Stone , 2004 Harrigan et al. 2006) . While the Board certainly must contend with the Fund's internal rules, and all studies of the determinants of IMF lending show that economic variables guide IMF lending, a growing body of literature indicates that international politics matter as well. 5 Finally, and perhaps most obviously, when they provide foreign aid through the IMF, the major shareholders pay a fraction of the cost rather than the total (Eldar 2008).
Theory and circumstantial evidence notwithstanding, the empirical question of whether IMF loans are correlated with actual voting behavior on the UNSC still remains. It is to this question that we now turn.
Data, analysis, results
We consider two dependent variables: (1) Sexton and Decker (1992) and Barro and Lee (2005) employ the fraction of times a country votes the same as the country of interest (either both voting yes, both voting no, both abstaining, or both being absent); Kegley and Hook (1991) discard abstentions or absences and consider how often countries are in agreement when they vote yes or no. All approaches then tally the annual scores according to their respective coding rules and divide by the total number of votes in each year. Below, we employ the method proposed by Kegley and Hook, discarding abstentions and absences. Our main results are also robust to using the method proposed by Wittkopf, where abstentions and absences count. Note that for observations of countries not on the UNSC, these variables are coded 0.
The indicator for temporary UNSC membership is coded 1 for 458 out of 7,237
observations. This makes sense -in any given year, there are ten countries serving as elected UNSC members. For countries on the UNSC, the mean of the "Voting with the USA" variable is 0.91 (and 0.06 for all observations); the median is 0.96. The mean of the "Voting against the USA" variable is 0.07 (and 0.004 for all observations). So, countries typically vote together on UNSC resolutions. There is, however, some variance, and we seek to understand if that variance can explain IMF lending.
We proceed as follows: First, we present descriptive data, which provide preliminary confirmations of our hypotheses. Then we turn to more rigorous regression analysis.
Descriptive evidence
Consider figures 1 through 4. In each, the x-axis presents voting behavior at the UNSC, and the y-axis presents the percentage of country observations participating in IMF programs, or, alternatively, the (logged) size of the IMF loan (we report commitments as opposed to disbursements). In these figures, we consider only observations of UNSC members (below, we also compare them to countries not on the UNSC). States on either "no" votes or "yes" votes are most likely to be under an IMF program. This descriptive evidence is thus favorable for our hypothesis.
Figures 3 and 4 focus on the size of loan commitments, respectively, for all programs combined and for concessional lending only. The pattern that emerges from both of these pictures supports our hypothesis. The highest commitments go to countries voting "yes" when the United States votes "yes" and "no" when the United States votes "no"; the lowest commitments go to countries voting "no" when the United States votes "yes" and "yes" when the 7 Note that our indicator variable is coded one if a concessional program is in effect for at least five months during a particular country-year (as taken from Dreher 2006 
Regression analysis
For the analysis of IMF participation, we employ a dichotomous indicator in a logit model conditioned on countries to control for fixed effects. We draw on Dreher et al. (2009a) , who follow Cameron et al. (2006) and Thompson (2006b) , clustering the covariance matrix in the country and year dimensions simultaneously. 8 This provides cluster-robust inference allowing for both serial and spatial correlation.
For the size of IMF loan commitments, we analyze the log of commitments in millions of current SDRs using a linear model with country and year fixed-effects and standard errors clustered at the country-level.
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For both dependent variables, we begin with the same specification used in Dreher et al. (2009a) , including past participation in IMF programs, (log) per capita GDP, investment (in percent of GDP), debt service (in percent of GDP), (log) checks and balances, and the government's budget surplus (in percent of GDP).
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Columns 1 through 3 of Table 1 present the main results for the dichotomous indicator of IMF program participation. Throughout, the control variables have the expected signs, in line with previous studies, and are all significant at the five percent level (or stronger). We focus on the independent variables of principle interest for this study: UNSC membership, Voting with the USA, and Voting against the USA.
Column 1 reproduces Dreher et al. (2009a) , showing that countries on the UNSC are more likely to participate in IMF programs than other countries, a finding that is statistically significant at the one percent level. When we introduce Voting with the USA, in column 2, things change. Recall that Voting with the USA takes on a value of zero when UNSC is coded 0, and is coded as the percentage of votes in common with the United States when UNSC is coded 1. So, one can think of Voting with the USA as an interaction with UNSC. The coefficient for variance estimator extends the standard cluster-robust variance estimator or sandwich estimator for one-way clustering and relies on similar, relatively-weak distributional assumptions. 9 We add "one" to account for zero values when taking the log. Note that the estimates would be identical if we employed loans in real terms, due to the inclusion of year fixed effects. The approach we employ is standard in the aid allocation literature (e.g., Kilby 2011). 10 The specification has been derived with a general-to-specific procedure to a specification including the most robust control variables as identified by Sturm, Berger and de Haan (2005 15 As Ai and Norton (2003: 123) point out, "the magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term." It can even be of opposite sign. Moreover, a simple t-test on the coefficient of the interaction term is not appropriate to test for the significance of the interaction. 16 See Dixit and Londregan (1996) on the logic of targeting swing voters.
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Column 4 adds the interaction term, which has a negative coefficient, significant at the five percent level. 
Conclusion
The aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis led to the reform of IMF governance. Changes were made in the name of legitimacy: If the IMF is to remain relevant, its governance structure must represent realities about the relative economic strength of its members. So, in 2012, emerging market countries will see their vote shares (and contributions) increase, while the relative power of Western countries will be reduced. Notably, China will move from the sixth largest voteholder to the third. But the most powerful member will remain the United States, retaining not only its top position, but also its veto power over key decisions at the IMF.
One reason these governance reforms are important -and proved controversial -is that the most powerful members of the IMF do employ the institution to pursue their self-interest.
Ironically, the powerful members of the IMF have, apparently, used their influence to buy legitimacy from another international organization. Power at the IMF translates into additional power at the UNSC.
Recent research has shown that UNSC membership is associated with a greater probability of participating in IMF programs and with less conditionality in terms of the number of specific policy conditions. UNSC members also get more World Bank loans, US bilateral aid, and more money from the UNDP. Our study is the first to consider actual voting behavior, and we show that it matters.
Voting with the United States is rewarded and voting against the United States is punished. The substantive effect of voting with the United States is statistically significant, but small (and driven by two outlying observations) -that of voting against the United States is also statistically significant and larger -by an order of magnitude (and not driven by outliers). The analysis of our original dataset leads to a straightforward conclusion: The United States uses its influence at the IMF to buy votes on the UN Security Council. Governments serving on the Security Council who publicly disagree with the United States on matters of international security are less likely to receive IMF loans, and if they do receive them, the loans are significantly smaller.
We are left with an intriguing conclusion. The United States may seek to legitimate its foreign policy objectives with approval from the UNSC, but that approval may, in part, be bought by trading votes for loans, and activity that is inconsistent with the stated objectives of the IMF, and thus may be viewed as less than legitimate. To the extent that a trade like this is possible, we believe that it can only be so because international organizations are not completely 22 transparent and are not well-understood by the general public. International organizations can thus be used to do the "dirty work" of governments (Vaubel 1986, Abbot and Snidal 1998 .4
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yes (766) abstain (73) no (2) US (1)- (3) and (log) IMF commitments in millions SDR in columns (4)-(8). Estimation is with two-way clustered conditional fixed effects logit in column (1)- (3) and OLS including fixed country and year effects in columns (4)-(8). p-values in parentheses; *, **, *** significant at 10, 5, 1%.
(1) Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the existence of an IMF program in columns (1)-(3) and (log) IMF commitments in millions SDR in columns (4)-(6). Estimation is with two-way clustered conditional fixed effects logit in column (1)-(3) and OLS including fixed country and year effects in columns (4)-(8). p-values in parentheses; *, **, *** significant at 10, 5, 1%.
(1) Table 3: UNSC voting and UNGA voting, 1970-2000 Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the existence of an IMF program in columns (1)-(2) and (log) IMF commitments in millions SDR in columns (3)-(4). Estimation is with two-way clustered conditional fixed effects logit in column (1)-(2) and OLS including fixed country and year effects in columns (3)-(4). p-values in parentheses; *, **, *** significant at 10, 5, 1%.
(1) Total debt service outstanding in percent of GNI.
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